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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Appellant Northeastern 
Pennsylvania Freethought Society (Freethought) would like to 
advertise on public buses in Lackawanna County, 
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Pennsylvania. Freethought proposed an ad displaying the word 
“Atheists” along with the group’s name and website. The 
County of Lackawanna Transit System (COLTS) rejected the 
ad under its policy which excludes religious and atheistic 
messages. Because that policy discriminates based on 
viewpoint, we hold that it violates the First Amendment.  
I 
COLTS provides public bus service in Lackawanna 
County. Because its ticket revenue is negligible, COLTS is 
funded almost exclusively by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation, Lackawanna County, and the federal 
government. COLTS leases advertising space on the inside and 
outside of its buses, but the revenue that generates makes up 
less than two percent of COLTS’s budget.  
Freethought is an association of atheists, agnostics, 
secularists, and skeptics. Its goals are to build a community for 
likeminded people, to organize social and educational events, 
and through these events and other activism to “promot[e] 
critical thinking and uphold[] the separation of church and 
state.” App. 140. Freethought advocates its view of proper 
church-state separation by filing complaints and protesting 
public religious displays.  
In 2012, Freethought organizer and spokesman Justin 
Vacula was a student at Marywood University in Scranton. One 
day during his commute to campus, Vacula noticed a “God 
Bless America” message on the outside of a COLTS bus. The 
message—which scrolled across the bus’s digital route-
information display when enabled by the driver—was added 
by the manufacturer after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Vacula complained and COLTS removed the message 
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from its software. This upset some drivers, including one who 
defiantly displayed a “God Bless America” magnet on the 
inside of his bus. Vacula complained again, and COLTS made 
the driver remove it.  
Because of these expressions of religious sentiment, 
Freethought proposed to run a “response” advertisement to 
“challenge a potential church/state violation and test 
COLTS’[s] advertising policy.” App. 1553. The proposed ad 
simply read “Atheists,” and included Freethought’s web 
address, superimposed on a blue sky with clouds. Vacula said 
the ad was meant to show local religious believers that there 
are atheists in the community and to provide a resource for 
those believers to learn about Freethought. The ad would also 
tell other nonbelievers in the region that they are “not alone” 
and that “a local organization for atheists exists.” App. 1553.  
Freethought submitted its proposal in January 2012, but 
COLTS rejected the ad. Communications director Gretchen 
Wintermantel decided Freethought “wanted to advertise so that 
they could spark a debate on our buses.” App. 1098. And the 
word “atheists” (or, for that matter, the words “Jews” or 
“Muslims”) might do just that. App. 1099. In rejecting 
Freethought’s proposal, COLTS relied on a policy it had 
adopted in 2011 that banned ads for tobacco products, alcohol, 
firearms, and political candidates. App. 686. It also banned ads 
that in COLTS’s “sole discretion” are “derogatory” to racial, 
religious, and other specified groups. Id. It even prohibited ads 
that are “objectionable, controversial[,] or would generally be 
offensive to COLTS’[s] ridership.” Id. 
Before 2011 COLTS had no policy—though it reserved 
in its contracts the right to reject “objectionable or 
controversial” ads. E.g., App. 340. It never exercised that right 
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until Wintermantel and her boss rejected an ad warning that 
“Judgment Day” was approaching. App. 56–57, 1051. They 
did so even though COLTS had routinely run religious ads in 
the past with no problem. That included ads for churches, the 
Office of Catholic Schools, and the evangelist Beverly 
Benton—who promised a “Saturday night miracle service” at 
a convention she headlined. App. 477. There is no evidence of 
record that those ads or any others had elicited a passenger 
complaint. Partisan political ads, gambling ads, and ads for 
alcoholic beverages all ran without incident. Even an ad for a 
virulently racist and anti-Semitic website was permitted 
without apparent complaint. COLTS nevertheless rejected the 
“Judgment Day” ad, believing its religious character could rile 
up passengers.  
The “Judgment Day” experience convinced 
Wintermantel it was time to implement a formal policy. She 
began researching other transit systems’ policies and identified 
controversies in other cities kindled by inflammatory ad 
campaigns. She reviewed a New York Times article about an 
atheist ad campaign in Fort Worth, which had drawn competing 
religious ads and a pastor-led boycott. The article also noted 
that atheist bus ads and billboards had been vandalized in 
Detroit, Tampa Bay, and Sacramento. In Cincinnati, the Times 
reported, a landlord took an atheist ad down after receiving 
threats. If all that could happen, Wintermantel thought, similar 
ads could upset COLTS riders and cause disturbances on its 
buses. So she drafted the 2011 policy and the COLTS board 
approved it.  
COLTS rejected Freethought’s first “Atheists” ad 
proposal in 2012 and a similar one in 2013. These rejections 
were based on the 2011 policy’s vaguest provision. COLTS had 
decided, in its “sole discretion,” that the “Atheists” ad would 
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be controversial. The first rejection was by phone, but the 
second came by letter which stated: 
COLTS does not accept advertisements that 
promote the belief that “there is no God” or 
advertisements that promote the belief that 
“there is a God” . . . . The existence or 
nonexistence of a supreme deity is a public issue. 
COLTS believes that your proposed 
advertisement may offend or alienate a segment 
of its ridership and thus negatively affect its 
revenue. COLTS does not wish to become 
embroiled in a debate over your group’s 
viewpoints. 
App. 701.  
About a week later, COLTS enacted a new policy to 
“clarify” the 2011 policy. App. 59–60. This 2013 policy is still 
in effect. It announced that COLTS opened its ad space “for the 
sole purpose of generating revenue for COLTS while at the 
same time maintaining or increasing its ridership.” App. 687. 
Besides banning many of the same ads as the 2011 policy 
(including “disparaging” ads and ads for firearms, alcohol, and 
tobacco), the 2013 policy featured new prohibitions on 
religious and political messages. COLTS reasoned that many 
have strong feelings about religion and politics, so excluding 
those messages would help keep the peace. The religion 
provision barred ads: 
that promote the existence or non-existence of a 
supreme deity, deities, being or beings; that 
address, promote, criticize or attack a religion or 
religions, religious beliefs or lack of religious 
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beliefs; that directly quote or cite scriptures, 
religious text or texts involving religious beliefs 
or lack of religious beliefs; or [that] are otherwise 
religious in nature.  
App. 687–88. The politics provision barred partisan and 
electioneering ads, and ads that “involv[e] an issue reasonably 
deemed by COLTS to be political in nature in that it directly or 
indirectly implicates the action, inaction, prospective action, or 
policies of a governmental entity.” App. 687. 
When Freethought proposed a third “Atheists” ad, 
COLTS rejected it under the 2013 policy’s religious speech 
prohibition. COLTS reiterated its position that the “existence 
or non-existence of a supreme deity is a public issue.” App. 
704. “It is COLTS’[s] goal to provide a safe and welcoming 
environment on its buses for the public at large,” the rejection 
letter explained, and “[t]he acceptance of ads that promote 
debate over public issues such as abortion, gun control or the 
existence of God in a confined space like the inside of a bus 
detracts from this goal.” Id.  
Eventually, Freethought proposed an ad that dropped 
the word “Atheists” and simply listed its name and web 
address. Wintermantel consulted COLTS’s attorney, who 
thought it was a borderline case under the 2013 policy. 
“[Vacula] is being tricky,” the lawyer opined, but he conceded 
the ad might not violate COLTS’s religious or political speech 
prohibitions, so they needed to research the matter. App. 1528. 
COLTS ultimately accepted the ad. But Freethought would still 
like to run its thrice-rejected “Atheists” ad, which “more 
clearly explain[s] who its members are.” Freethought Br. 19. 




Freethought challenged COLTS’s 2013 policy, seeking 
a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction forbidding 
COLTS from enforcing the policy. The District Court ruled for 
COLTS after a one-day bench trial. The Court held COLTS’s 
policy viewpoint neutral, reasoning that the religious speech 
prohibition put the entire subject of religion out of bounds. It 
also deemed COLTS’s ad space a limited public forum, even 
though it had probably once been a designated public forum. 
The Court grounded that conclusion in COLTS’s statement of 
intent “not to become a public forum” and its “practice of 
permitting only limited access to the advertising spaces on its 
buses.” Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cty. of Lackawanna 
Transit Sys., 327 F. Supp. 3d 767, 779–80 (M.D. Pa. 2018). 
Holding Freethought’s “Atheists” ad outside the forum’s 
bounds, the Court turned to whether that restriction was 
reasonable. 
The ad space was first opened, the Court found, to raise 
revenue. With its 2013 policy, COLTS added the purpose of 
“maintaining or increasing COLTS’[s] ridership.” Id. at 781. 
The Court held the policy’s restrictions were reasonably 
connected to those goals. First, the policy was intended to 
“keep COLTS neutral on matters of public concern,” which the 
Court said is “an especially strong interest supporting the 
reasonableness in limiting speech.” Id. at 782. Second, the 
Court held the policy was reasonably connected to rider safety, 
since threats to rider safety also threaten revenue and ridership. 
“Given the decrease in civil tolerance and the increase in social 
unrest and violence in today’s society,” the Court explained, 
allowing ads like Freethought’s might provoke “a controversial 
discussion” which could “potentially lead to a dangerous 
situation for both passengers and drivers.” Id. at 782–83. 
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Finally, the Court held the 2013 policy was not 
unconstitutionally vague because “a person of ordinary 
intelligence can generally tell what types of advertisements are 
permitted or proscribed.” Id. at 784.  
Freethought filed this timely appeal.  
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Freethought’s 
First Amendment claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Where, 
as here, “the speaker unsuccessfully claimed a violation of free 
speech rights in the trial court,” Pittsburgh League of Young 
Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 653 F.3d 
290, 295 (3d Cir. 2011), we conduct an independent review of 
the record. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 
U.S. 485, 499 (1984).  
IV 
We approach this case as a facial challenge to COLTS’s 
prohibition of religious speech. The First Amendment doctrine 
underlying Freethought’s challenge leads ineluctably to facial 
invalidity—so we need not “pause to consider whether [the 
provision] might admit some permissible applications.” Iancu 
v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); see Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010) (“[T]he distinction between 
facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it 
has some automatic effect or that it must always control the 
pleadings and disposition in every case involving a 
constitutional challenge.”). If the religious speech prohibition 
as written “‘aim[s] at the suppression of’ views,” Brunetti, 139 
S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1767 
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(2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)), it is invalid, see id. If instead it’s an impermissible 
content based restriction, that too leads to facial invalidity. See 
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885, 1888 
(2018); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding statute 
“not narrowly tailored to advance [the government’s] 
objective” and so “inconsistent with the First Amendment”); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 801 (1989) 
(“[T]he validity of the regulation depends on the relation it 
bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, 
not on the extent to which it furthers the government’s interests 
in an individual case.”). In either case COLTS “violate[d] the 
Constitution when it passed the [policy],” Diop v. 
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 232 n.10 (3d Cir. 2011).  
V 
Government actors like COLTS cannot restrict speech 
because they “disapprov[e] of the ideas expressed.” R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Yet not every public 
space is Hyde Park, so a government may sometimes impose 
content or speaker limitations that protect the use of its 
property. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1885. But no matter what 
kind of property is at issue, viewpoint discrimination is out of 
bounds. 
Viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious form of 
content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Rather than aiming at 
an entire subject, it “targets . . . particular views taken by 
speakers.” Id. And that violates the First Amendment’s most 
basic promise. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) 
(collecting cases). It empowers the censor to deprive the citizen 
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of the opportunity to persuade. So in any forum, “[t]he 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the 
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of 
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 829; see Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 
533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001).  
Distinguishing subject matter from viewpoint can be 
difficult. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830–31. Fortunately, “our 
task here is greatly simplified by a trilogy of Supreme Court 
decisions each addressing blanket bans on religious messages 
and each concluding that such bans constitute impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination.” Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 55 
(2d Cir. 2010). Those cases—Rosenberger, Lamb’s Chapel, 
and Good News Club—govern this one. 
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia withheld 
subsidies from student groups whose activities “primarily 
promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a 
deity or an ultimate reality.” 515 U.S. at 825. An undergraduate 
group that published Wide Awake, a “magazine of 
philosophical and religious expression,” challenged that 
policy. Id. at 825–26. Wide Awake was founded to “facilitate 
discussion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and 
tolerance of Christian viewpoints,” and “to provide a unifying 
focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.” Id. (citation 
and alterations omitted). To that end, its writers opined from a 
Christian perspective on issues like racism, pregnancy, and 
student stress. Id. at 826.  
The Court held the University had restricted viewpoint, 
not subject matter. “Religion may be a vast area of inquiry,” 
the Court reasoned, “but it also provides, as it did here, a 
specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a 
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variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.” Id. at 
831. The policy was viewpoint based because it “select[ed] for 
disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with 
religious editorial viewpoints.” Id. Student news groups could 
write on racism, or stress, or pregnancy—but not if their faith 
informed the message. 
The Rosenberger dissent argued that the restriction was 
based on subject matter, not viewpoint, because it applied to all 
religions and “agnostics and atheists as well.” See 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 895–96 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
COLTS makes a similar argument here. But as the Court 
explained in Rosenberger, that argument “reflects an 
insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that 
antireligious speech is the only response to religious speech.” 
Id. at 831. Within a given subject, “[i]t is as objectionable to 
exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the 
debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, 
economic, or social viewpoint.” Id.; see Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 
2299. 
To reach its holding, the Rosenberger Court relied 
mainly on Lamb’s Chapel. In that case, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a ban on the use of public-school property for 
“religious purposes” that had stymied a group’s efforts to 
screen religious lectures on family issues and child rearing. 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384, 393 (1993). As in Rosenberger, it did not matter 
“[t]hat all religions and all uses for religious purposes are 
treated alike” because the lectures—though avowedly 
religious—discussed topics the policy otherwise permitted. Id. 
In short, Rosenberger “clarified the distinction between 
content-based and viewpoint discrimination and adopted a 
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broad construction of the latter, providing greater protection to 
private religious speech on public property.” Summum v. 
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 917 (10th Cir. 1997).1 The Court 
provided yet more clarity in Good News Club. It granted 
certiorari in that case to resolve “a conflict among the Courts 
of Appeals on the question whether speech can be excluded 
from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature 
of the speech.” 533 U.S. at 105. As in Lamb’s Chapel and 
Rosenberger, the Court answered “no.” 
The Court held it was viewpoint discrimination to bar 
the use for religious purposes of a space otherwise available 
for “instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts” 
and for “social, civic and recreational meetings and 
entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare 
of the community.” Id. at 102. The Good News Club, which 
wanted to offer after-school religious instruction, must have 
equal access to a forum that allowed others to speak on morals 
and character development. Id. at 108–09. If a forum is open to 
                                              
1 In arguing for a narrower construction of viewpoint, 
our dissenting colleague claims our holding will deter 
governments from creating forums for speech. Dissenting Op. 
8–9. That concern is relevant to deciding whether a 
government has opened a forum (and what kind of forum). See 
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 
680–83 (1998). But it cannot bear on the viewpoint 
discrimination analysis because courts should not nurture 
forums that “silence dissent and distort the marketplace of 
ideas,” Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
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teaching morals through Aesop’s Fables, it must be open to 
religious moral instruction too. Id.     
Good News Club also foreclosed the argument that a 
broad prohibition on religious speech can validate religious 
viewpoint discrimination. Rosenberger noted in dicta that the 
university’s policy did not prohibit religion as a subject matter. 
515 U.S. at 831. That comment might have been read to 
suggest a broader policy could bar religious perspectives on 
otherwise allowable topics—so long as the prohibition was 
phrased to “exclude religion as a subject matter.” Good News 
Club rejected that proposition and disclaimed any reliance on 
this dictum. See 533 U.S. at 110–11. The Good News Club’s 
“quintessentially religious” activities, id. at 111, could not be 
excluded even though the policy broadly forbade use of the 
forum “for religious purposes,” id. at 103.  
Our Court reinforced Good News Club’s understanding 
of Rosenberger in Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey 
Inc. v. Stafford Township School District, 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 
2004). That case involved limitations on access to facilities and 
back-to-school nights. Id. at 519. Some community groups 
were pre-approved for access, while others could be added at 
the school district’s discretion. Id. As for the content allowed, 
the policy required advance approval by the district and a nexus 
to the students or school. Id. at 520. It forbade partisan and for-
profit messages as well as solicitations. Id. The district allowed 
Child Evangelism to host meetings like those in Good News 
Club, but denied it permission to distribute its flyers, 
permission slips, and Bibles. Id. at 523. Rejecting the district’s 
purportedly viewpoint neutral rationales as “either incoherent 
or euphemisms for viewpoint-based religious discrimination,” 
id. at 527, we underscored what was already clear after Good 
News Club. Whether or not a government claims to have 
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excluded “religion as a subject or category of speech,” “if 
government permits the discussion of a topic from a secular 
perspective, it may not shut out speech that discusses the same 
topic from a religious perspective.” Id. at 528; see Donovan ex 
rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 226 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
The same is true in this case. “Whatever its stated intent, 
[COLTS’s] ban on religious messages in practice operates not 
to restrict speech to certain subjects but instead to distinguish 
between those who seek to express secular and religious views 
on the same subjects.” Byrne, 623 F.3d at 56–57; see Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 
(1985). 
By the terms of the 2013 policy and as shown by 
COLTS’s permissive practice, the forum is open to messages 
on all topics not expressly banned. As the Seventh Circuit 
explained, “[t]he absence of an explicit list of permissible 
subjects upon which discourse is permissible in [a] nonpublic 
forum does not mean that there is no ‘otherwise includible 
subject’ for discussion in the forum . . . . [such] policies 
impliedly allow[] the distribution of all other written material 
. . . .” Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Bldg. Auth., 63 
F.3d 581, 590 (7th Cir. 1995). We thus disagree with the 
dissent’s argument that the viewpoint analysis in Rosenberger, 
Lamb’s Chapel, and Good News Club can be distinguished by 
the fact those cases involved “prospectively defined, 
permissible subject matter.” Dissenting Op. 6 (quoting 
Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 
F.3d 314, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J., concurring)).  
As Vacula explained in 2012, the “Atheists” ad was 
meant to communicate to believers and atheists alike that “a 
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local organization for atheists exists,” and to atheists in 
particular that they are “not alone.” App. 1553. The ad, though 
minimalistic, reasonably communicates those messages. 
Nothing in the record suggests COLTS’s policy would prohibit 
secular associations from advertising their organizational 
philosophy or from communicating the message: “We exist, 
this is who we are, consider learning about or joining us.” See 
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393. But atheistic and religious 
associations are banned from saying the same thing because of 
the character of their speech. 
Similarly, a healthcare provider may tout its services—
so long as it doesn’t disclose that those services are (or once 
were) part of a religious tradition. Geisinger Health System is 
in; Lutheran Home Care & Hospice is out. And the Diocese of 
Scranton may run an ad encouraging the public to “Consider 
Adoption”—provided it doesn’t say why.  
It’s true that Freethought’s “Atheists” ad relates to the 
“subject” of religion writ large. But at its core, its message is 
one of organizational existence, identity, and outreach. Even if 
that speech “is quintessentially religious’ or ‘decidedly 
religious in nature,’” Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111, it may 
still “constitute a separate viewpoint on a wide variety of 
seemingly secular subject matter,” Good News/Good Sports 
Club v. Sch. Dist. of City of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1507 (8th Cir. 
1994). What matters for the viewpoint discrimination inquiry 
isn’t how religious a message is, but whether it communicates 
a religious (or atheistic) viewpoint on a subject to which the 
forum is otherwise open.  
This point is well-illustrated by a Second Circuit case 
which invalidated a Vermont law prohibiting deity names and 
other religious references on license plates. Byrne v. Rutledge, 
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623 F.3d at 49–50. The motorist in Byrne wanted his plate to 
say JN36TN—a reference to the oft-quoted biblical passage 
John 3:16. The court explained this reference spoke to several 
possible topics, all of which were open to secular speech. 
Whether the plate was “intended . . . as a statement of personal 
belief or philosophy or simply as a statement of self-identity as 
a Christian or affiliation with the Christian church . . . . The 
critical fact is that Vermont permits” the use of its forum “for 
comment on all of these subjects, so long as the comment is 
from a secular perspective.” Id. at 57. In the same way, COLTS 
prohibits Freethought’s statement of organizational identity 
just because of that statement’s atheistic character. For that 
reason, we hold that the 2013 policy facially discriminates 
against atheistic and religious viewpoints on all of the many 
topics permitted in the forum. 
We recognize that this holding diverges from a recent 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 897 F.3d 314 (D.C. Cir. 
2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-1455 (May 20, 2019). The 
court there reasoned that because WMATA prohibited 
messages on many subjects, it had not “invite[d] . . . debate on 
religion.” Id. at 327. That narrower forum, the court held, 
authorized the transit agency’s ban on “[a]dvertisements that 
promote or oppose any religion, religious practice or belief” 
despite the rule announced in Rosenberger, Lamb’s Chapel, 
and Good News Club. Id. at 318–19. WMATA’s policy isn’t the 
same as COLTS’s, see Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. 
Area Transit Auth., 281 F. Supp. 3d 88, 96 (D.D.C. 2017), and 
the facts of the cases are different. But we respectfully disagree 
with our sister court. 
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The Archdiocese of Washington proposed an 
evangelistic ad to run on the exterior of WMATA’s buses. The 
ad depicted “a starry night and the silhouettes of three 
shepherds and sheep on a hill facing a bright shining star high 
in the sky, along with the words ‘Find the Perfect Gift.’” 
Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 320. It also included a web 
address and social media hashtag. Id. WMATA rejected the ad 
under the religious speech prohibition described above. The 
D.C. Circuit held WMATA’s policy regulated content, not 
viewpoint. Id. at 325. To make that determination, the court 
thought it needed to conduct a forum analysis. Id. at 321–24. 
Then, emphasizing the narrowness of the forum, the court held 
WMATA’s policy permissibly excluded “religion as a subject 
matter.” Id. at 327 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831). 
Finally, the court rejected the Archdiocese’s arguments that the 
topics it wanted to address were open to secular speakers. Id. 
at 329.  
Our disagreement starts at the beginning—with the D.C. 
Circuit’s choice to conduct a forum analysis before 
determining whether the policy discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint. That put the cart before the horse because the type 
of forum sheds no light on whether a policy or decision 
discriminates against a certain viewpoint. And viewpoint 
discrimination is impermissible in any forum. Mansky, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1885; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion); Good 
News Club, 533 U.S. at 111–12; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
Courts “need not tackle the forum-selection question” since 
“[r]egardless of whether the advertising space is a public or 
nonpublic forum, the [speaker] is entitled to relief” if it 
establishes viewpoint discrimination. Pittsburgh League, 653 
F.3d at 296; see Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 
118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The [F]irst 
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[A]mendment’s ban on discriminating against religious speech 
does not depend on whether the school is a ‘public forum’ and, 
if so, what kind . . . .”). So Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and 
Good News Club cannot be distinguished by reasoning that 
those forums were open to a “wide[r] range of subjects,” 
Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 327. What matters is whether 
the range of subjects—narrow, wide, or in-between—includes 
the one the speaker wants to address. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 
Int’l v. Dep’t of Aviation of City of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (“It may be that an entire category of speech is 
banned, but this hardly satisfies a viewpoint inquiry.”).  
The D.C. Circuit was also concerned that “[t]he 
Archdiocese’s position would eliminate the government’s 
prerogative to exclude religion as a subject matter in any non-
public forum.” Id. at 325. But that “prerogative” is based on a 
dictum in Rosenberger that the Supreme Court has since 
disclaimed. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110. And it echoes 
the protestations of the Rosenberger dissent, not the reasoning 
of the majority. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 898 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“If this amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the 
Court has all but eviscerated the line between viewpoint and 
content.”). In any case, no prerogative to ban subjects can 
justify viewpoint discrimination. 
Perhaps a forum could be defined so narrowly that 
religious perspectives would be non-germane. But the COLTS 
ad space is not such a forum. And we doubt whether a forum 
like COLTS’s—defined by its exclusions and otherwise open, 
rather than defined by its beneficiaries and otherwise closed—
could ever fit the bill. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (“[A] 
speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes 
to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the 
forum or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for 
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whose especial benefit the forum was created,” but “the 
government violates the First Amendment when it denies 
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he 
espouses on an otherwise includible subject.” (citations 
omitted)). That COLTS has tied those exclusions to speech it 
considers “controversial” only compounds the problem. See 
Child Evangelism, 386 F.3d at 527 (“A group is controversial 
or divisive because some take issue with its viewpoint.”).  
It makes sense that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to exclude religion “as a subject matter” in a forum 
open to topics susceptible to a religious perspective. After all, 
a typical “subject” is not “a comprehensive body of thought” 
from which “a variety of subjects may be discussed and 
considered,” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. Compare Choose 
Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(finding viewpoint neutrality because the government 
“excluded the entire subject of abortion from its specialty-plate 
program”), with Byrne, 623 F.3d at 57 (holding blanket ban on 
“religious” vanity plates cannot justify excluding religious 
expression of self-identity when secular expression is 
allowed). That’s why we must “broad[ly] constru[e] 
[viewpoint discrimination], providing greater protection to 
private religious speech on public property.” Summum, 130 
F.3d at 917. 
Religion is not only a subject. It’s a worldview through 
which believers see countless issues. It was so for our Nation’s 
founders, whose moral thesis changed the world and conceived 
a new birth of freedom in the United States: “that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.” The Declaration of 
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Is there room for our 
22 
 
revolutionary creed on a COLTS bus? Apparently not. As 
COLTS’s counsel admitted at oral argument, the word 
“Creator” would be a problem.  
Finally, to the extent the D.C. Circuit reasoned that 
religious speech on a permissible topic may be censored if it is 
not “primarily” about that topic, see Archdiocese of Wash., 897 
F.3d at 329, we disagree with that too. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Good News Club, that a message on a permitted 
topic is “quintessentially religious” or “decidedly religious in 
nature” does not relegate it to second-class status. See 533 U.S. 
at 111.  
VI 
Even if COLTS’s ban on religious speech were 
viewpoint neutral, it would still need to survive scrutiny as a 
content based restriction. That means, at a minimum, it must 
be reasonable “in the light of the purpose of the forum and all 
the surrounding circumstances.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.2 
                                              
2 If COLTS’s ad space were a designated public forum, 
as Freethought urges, strict scrutiny would apply. We need not 
decide what kind of forum the ad space is, because the religious 
speech ban fails even if the space is a limited or nonpublic 
forum. But we doubt COLTS has successfully closed its forum 
to Freethought’s speech. 
  
COLTS opened its ad space as a designated public 
forum. From when it began selling ads until the “Judgment 




                                              
religious, political, and commercial ads during that time. See 
Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 
F.3d 242, 250–52 (3d Cir. 1998). So its forum was open to 
Freethought’s atheistic message. See id.  
 
And while COLTS may limit or close the forum at any 
time, United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1986), 
it cannot do so in an improper manner. See The Koala v. 
Khosla,    F.3d   , 2019 WL 3311148, at *12 (9th Cir. July 24, 
2019); Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 77 (1st 
Cir. 2004).  
 
We doubt the 2013 policy closed the forum. First, its 
central prohibition—on political speech—includes a tangle of 
double negatives that is vague enough to ensnare nearly any 
message. It bans “advertisements involving an issue 
reasonably deemed by COLTS to be political in nature in that 
it directly or indirectly implicates the action, inaction, 
prospective action, or policies of a governmental entity.” App. 
687 (emphases added). That does not provide a sufficiently 
definite standard for COLTS to exercise discretion. See 
Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1891. And second, the “expressive use 
[of COLTS’s ad space] has not interfered with providing [bus 
service] to the public.” Christ’s Bride, 148 F.3d at 250. That 
suggests its new restrictions are not “truly part of ‘the process 
of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the 
intended purpose of the property,’” United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l 
Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 351–52 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 49 (1983)). 
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This standard does not demand “the most reasonable or the 
only reasonable limitation,” so “a finding of strict 
incompatibility between the nature of the speech or the identity 
of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is 
not mandated.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808. Still, our review is 
more exacting than the deferential rational basis standard. 
NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435, 442–43 (3d Cir. 
2016). COLTS bears the burden of showing its restrictions are 
reasonable. Id. at 443.  
COLTS opened its advertising space to raise revenue. 
The 2013 policy states COLTS will sell ads for the “sole 
purpose of generating revenue for COLTS while at the same 
time maintaining or increasing its ridership.” App. 687. 
Freethought argues we should disregard those latter interests—
maintaining or increasing ridership—because COLTS 
stipulated that they were not goals when it first opened its ad 
space and when it enacted the 2011 policy. But we assess both 
the speech forum and the broader government property of 
which it is part. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801–02. An 
advertising program that deters all or many riders is 
inconsistent with the purpose of a public bus. See NAACP, 834 
F.3d at 445–46 (holding commonsense inferences can support 
explanation of forum’s purpose). There’s no indication COLTS 
wanted to transform its buses from public transit to rolling 
billboards. So we assess reasonableness given both goals: ad 
revenue and ridership. 
Does the religious speech ban reasonably pursue those 
goals? Freethought says suppressing controversial speech is 
inherently illegitimate. But this confuses means and ends. A 
policy that on its face singled out “controversial” or 
“offensive” messages would indeed be viewpoint 
discriminatory. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299–2300. But 
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unlike the 2011 policy, the 2013 policy does not do that. “The 
First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral 
exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum 
and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose.” 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811; see Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
COLTS’s goal is not to squelch controversial speech for its own 
sake, but to avoid disruption by excluding categories of speech 
it believes likely to inflame passions. 
While that may be a permissible goal sometimes, it 
should be viewed with suspicion for several reasons. It 
conflicts with the core purposes of the First Amendment. See, 
e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (“The whole theory of viewpoint 
neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same 
respect as are majority views.”); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 
at 118; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death.”). It invites a 
heckler’s veto by signaling that the government will suppress 
unpopular speech if the public behaves badly. See Seattle 
Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County, 781 F.3d 489, 
504 (9th Cir. 2015) (Christen, J., dissenting). And it’s hard for 
officials to apply these standards objectively—and harder still 
for courts to assess whether they have done so. See NAACP, 
834 F.3d at 446. We proceed with those cautionary principles 
in mind. 
COLTS argues that heated debates on its buses could 
deter riders and escalate to the point of distracting the driver, 
endangering passengers, and reducing revenue. But since 
rational basis review doesn’t apply here, we should not conjure 
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any “conceivable state of facts,” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993), that could support COLTS’s 
action. True, COLTS cited disruptions on other transit systems 
in formulating its policy—disruptions that led to anonymous 
threats against buses, as well as boycotts and vandalism. While 
threats, boycotts, and vandalism could threaten ridership, 
COLTS stipulated its policy “was specifically to prevent debate 
inside of COLTS’[s] buses . . . and had nothing to do with 
debate outside the buses.” App. 57. Yet COLTS has failed to 
cite a single debate caused by an ad on one of its buses. 
To be sure, a government “need not wait until havoc is 
wreaked to restrict access to a nonpublic forum.” Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 810. But if it wants to censor topics it deems 
“controversial,” to avoid disruption, it needs more than mere 
supposition. Cf. Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1157 (“[T]here is no 
evidence that a general allowance of political or public interest 
advertising would otherwise undermine [the government’s] 
ability to rent display cases. Only by imagining objections to 
particular viewpoints can any commercial inconvenience be 
conceived.”). The censorship of messages because they are 
controversial is viewpoint discrimination. See Brunetti, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2299–2300. It follows that when the state seeks to ban 
particular topics for fear of public controversy, it must make a 
showing of threatened disruption.  
But the record provides ample reason to doubt COLTS’s 
concerns. COLTS has never received a complaint about an ad, 
even though one ad hawked “notes from the underground” and 
“bulletproof commentary for enlightened minds” courtesy of a 
racist and anti-Semitic blog. App. 346–49. No one complained 
about the bevy of religious and political ads COLTS ran before 
it enacted its policies. In fact, the only rider complaints in the 
record relate to COLTS’s decision to exclude Freethought’s ad.  
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What about COLTS’s solicitude for a captive audience? 
The Supreme Court has long connected reasonableness in 
protecting a forum with the intrusiveness of the restricted 
expressive activity. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment);3 
Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1161–62 (Flaum, J., concurring) 
(collecting cases). But COLTS’s stated interest in leaving a 
captive audience in peace is undercut because much of the 
relevant forum is the exterior of its buses.4 A rider may see the 
                                              
3 In Lehman, the Supreme Court upheld a prohibition on 
political advertisements in buses’ “car card” interior 
advertising spaces. 418 U.S. at 299, 303–04 (plurality opinion). 
A plurality held the prohibition was reasonable in part because 
captive riders would otherwise be “subjected to the blare of 
political propaganda.” Id. at 304. In his concurrence in the 
judgment, Justice Douglas agreed—not because political ads 
were especially objectionable, but because riders were a 
captive audience. Id. at 307–08 (Douglas, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Lehman predates modern public forum analysis but 
has been retconned into that framework. See Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803–04. 
 
4 Paradoxically, COLTS insists the forum is limited to 
the exterior ad space. We define the relevant forum by the 
access the speaker seeks. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. But here 
Freethought didn’t specify whether it sought access to the 
exterior or interior space and COLTS rejected the ad out of 




ad for a few moments as the bus approaches or while boarding, 
but is not subjected to it while riding the bus. Such contact is 
hardly as intrusive as, say, solicitation. See Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 689 (1992) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 209 n.5 (1975) (“[B]oth the plurality and 
concurring opinions [in Lehman] recognized that the degree of 
captivity and the resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly 
greater for a passenger on a bus than for a person on the 
street.”). To be sure, the captive audience concern does apply 
to part of COLTS’s forum (the interior space). But Lehman is 
“properly . . . viewed as [a] narrow exception[] to the general 
prohibition against subject-matter distinctions.” Consol. 
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 
539 (1980). “The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in 
our pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and 
ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are inescapably captive 
audiences for many purposes.’” Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210 
(quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 
(1970)). And the traditional rule is that offended observers 
must “avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply 
by averting their eyes.” Lehman, 418 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 
(1971)). For those reasons and the ones that follow, we do not 
                                              
Freethought that the forum includes both spaces, which are 
governed by the same policy. Cf. Christ’s Bride, 148 F.3d at 
248 n.2. Since COLTS doesn’t view the two spaces as different 
enough to warrant different treatment, we see no reason why it 
should benefit from rejecting Freethought’s ad before the 
parties ever discussed what kind of ad it would be. 
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think solicitude for a (partially) captive audience can bear the 
weight of COLTS’s restrictions.  
Beyond the thin support for its concerns, COLTS’s 
enforcement is scattershot at best. COLTS ran an ad 
encouraging parents to immunize their children—an ad it 
maintains it would not run today. App. 49–50, 1141. That’s 
presumably because vaccination has become a contentious 
social and political issue. See Freethought, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 
781 (“COLTS admittedly ran the immunization advertisement 
without a clear understanding of the controversial nature of the 
subject matter at the time . . . .”). How did Wintermantel learn 
of this debate? Through “[f]riends with kids, and news[] 
media.” App. 1141. We don’t blame Wintermantel for doing 
her level best, but this episode reveals the arbitrariness in 
COLTS’s approach. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1890 (“[T]hat 
measure may turn in significant part on the background 
knowledge and media consumption of the particular [official] 
applying it.”). 
It’s also unclear whether and when information about an 
advertiser beyond the face of the ad is relevant. At least under 
the 2011 policy, COLTS would sometimes access the 
advertiser’s website before rejecting an ad. For example, it 
excluded the facially permissible “Wilkes-Barre Scranton 
Night Out” because its website showed the event promoted 
drinking. See App. 1074–75. The same scrutiny wasn’t applied 
to the racist and anti-Semitic blog—much to COLTS’s horror 
when it was shown the bigoted website during this litigation. 
While COLTS says that under the 2013 policy it no longer 
considers anything beyond the face of an ad, there was 
deposition testimony that COLTS accepted Freethought’s 
fourth ad in part because the “website did not encourage 
debate.” App. 1358. And when Wintermantel emailed 
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COLTS’s lawyer about the ad, she referenced Freethought’s 
website and its definition of the organization. The lawyer’s 
response—“[w]e have to research this,” App. 1528—also 
suggested they would go beyond the face of the ad. These 
inconsistencies raise the specter of arbitrary censorship. An 
obscure religious reference may be allowed, while the same 
message from a better-known faith tradition is excluded. Even 
worse, officials may selectively decide to dig deeper when they 
receive proposals from disfavored groups.  
Given all that, COLTS’s reasonableness argument is 
threadbare. And it reaches its breaking point when we come to 
the religious speech ban. COLTS likely could exclude many 
ads that might upset its riders through more targeted 
prohibitions. See Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area 
Transit Auth., 910 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(Griffith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“WMATA was concerned about the public response to ads on 
controversial issues, but as the Archdiocese points out, 
WMATA’s policies separately address issue-oriented ads 
without any need for its ban on religious speech.”); Am. 
Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 901 
F.3d 356, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“WMATA decided to refuse 
AFDI’s advertisements only because of their political 
nature.”), cert. denied, 2019 WL 400746 (U.S. June 3, 2019); 
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for 
Reg’l Transp. (SMART), 698 F.3d 885, 894 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“Because the ban on political advertising was permissible, it 
was reasonable for SMART to turn down the fatwa 
advertisement as political.”).  
Instead, COLTS banned all religious messages. Even if 
that weren’t viewpoint discrimination, it is unreasonable to so 
broadly single out for exclusion speech entitled to special 
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protection. See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 
100 (1st Cir. 2004) (Torruella, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Simply put, the First Amendment does not 
recognize state authority to regulate religious expression 
merely because it might offend other persons.”); Hedges, 9 
F.3d at 1298 (“Even when the government may forbid a 
category of speech outright, it may not discriminate on account 
of the speaker’s viewpoint. Especially not on account of a 
religious subject matter, which the free exercise clause of the 
first amendment singles out for protection.” (citation omitted)); 
see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943) 
(religious advertising “occupies the same high estate under the 
First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching 
from the pulpits”); cf. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 
Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017) (“The Free 
Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal 
treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target 
the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious 
status.’” (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993))). 
COLTS argues with some force that its blanket ban 
serves valid interests in appearing neutral. But the “‘guarantee 
of neutrality is respected, not offended’ when religious persons 
benefit incidentally from ‘neutral criteria and evenhanded 
policies.’” Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 
F.3d 144, 177 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Good News Club, 533 
U.S. at 114). There’s nothing neutral about prohibiting all 
religious speech as “disruptive.” 
Moreover, under COLTS’s current approach, it must 
distinguish messages that are “about” religion from those that 
address a permitted topic from a religious perspective. 
Assuming that distinction is viable, we question whether it is 
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reasonable to ask officials to draw it. True, reasonableness 
review imposes a light burden. NAACP, 834 F.3d at 449. And 
we do not suggest there is any one way that COLTS had to 
pursue its interests. But COLTS bears the burden to show that 
extirpating religion from its forum was reasonable. Id. at 443. 
For all the reasons we have stated, we hold it has not done so.  
VII 
Having prevailed on the merits, Freethought must show 
it is entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of discretion. 
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 
157 (2010). It must show that (1) it has suffered irreparable 
injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance 
of hardships tips in its favor; and (4) granting an injunction 
would not be against the public interest. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
Each element is satisfied. 
The first two elements “typically constitute two sides of 
the same inquiry, for the ‘availability of adequate monetary 
damages belies a claim of irreparable injury.’” TD Bank NA v. 
Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 282 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Bennington 
Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 
179 (3d Cir. 2008)). Freethought’s ad has already been rejected 
once under the 2013 policy, which remains in effect. No 
remedy at law can cure Freethought’s First Amendment injury 
or give it the prospective relief it seeks. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, 
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.”). To receive full relief, Freethought must 
be allowed to run its “Atheists” ad. Similarly, the balance of 
hardships tips in Freethought’s favor. COLTS’s “need to 
redraft one part of [the 2013 policy] . . . hardly compare[s] to 
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the deprivation of [Freethought] and . . . other potential 
speakers’ constitutional right to engage in free speech.” Barrett 
v. Walker Cty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 
2017). Finally, we state the obvious by noting that the public 
interest is not disserved by enforcing the First Amendment’s 
core protection against viewpoint discrimination.  
* * * 
The 2013 policy’s ban on speech related to religion 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. And it is not a 
permissible limitation on COLTS’s forum, however that forum 
is characterized. We will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and instruct it to grant declaratory relief and issue an 
injunction barring enforcement of the 2013 policy’s religious 
speech ban against Freethought. 
  
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 The majority concludes that COLTS’s policy 
discriminates based on viewpoint and that, even if the policy 
were viewpoint neutral, it fails to survive scrutiny as a 
content-based restriction.  However, I do not believe that the 
transit system’s policy rises to the level of viewpoint 
discrimination.  As the D.C. Circuit has recently explained, 
there is a critical difference between the prohibition of 
religious (and atheistic) perspectives on otherwise permissible 
subject matters—which constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination—and the exclusion of religion itself as a 
subject matter—which does not.  This case clearly implicates 
a subject-matter prohibition.  Furthermore, COLTS satisfies 
its burden of showing that its policy is reasonable (and I 
conclude that it has closed the forum).  Accordingly, I must 




 According to the majority, its holding that COLTS’s 
2013 Policy facially discriminates against religious and 
atheistic viewpoints on the various topics otherwise permitted 
in the forum “diverges from a recent decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Archdiocese of 
Washington v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority, 897 F.3d 314 (D.C. Cir. 2018), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 18-1455 (May 20, 2019).”  (Majority Opinion at 
17-18.)  Among other things, it asserts that the purported 
“prerogative” to exclude religion as a subject matter is 
premised on dictum in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), which the 
Supreme Court disclaimed in Good News Club v.  Milford 
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Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).  “[T]o the extent the D.C. 
Circuit reasoned that religious speech on a permissible topic 
may be censored if it is not ‘primarily’ about that topic, see 
Archdiocese of Wash, 897 F.3d at 329, we disagree with that 
too.  As the Supreme Court explained in Good News Club, 
that a message on a permitted topic is ‘quintessentially 
religious’ or ‘decidedly religious in nature’ does not relegate 
it to second-class status.  See 533 U.S. at 111.”  (Id. at 21.)  In 
the end, the majority determines that Freethought’s “Atheists” 
advertisement, although it relates to the subject matter of 
religion, communicates a viewpoint on other subject matters 
permitted in the forum.    
  
 To addition to disagreeing with its assessment of the 
“Atheists” advertisement, I reject the majority’s reading of 
the existing case law as well as (on a more fundamental level) 
its understanding of the fundamental concepts of viewpoint 
and subject matter.  In short, like its Washington, D.C. 
counterpart, COLTS “may exclude religion as a subject 
matter from its advertising space.”  Archdiocese of Wash., 
897 F.3d at 319.   
 
 Initially, the majority places special emphasis on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Good News Club.  It, however, 
has read too much into this opinion.  In Rosenberger, the 
Supreme Court stated that, “[b]y the very terms of the SAF 
prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as a 
subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those 
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial 
viewpoints.”  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.  In Good News 
Club, the Court did explain that, “[a]though in Rosenberger 
there was no prohibition on religion as a subject matter, our 
holding did not rely on this factor,” Good News Club, 533 
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U.S. at 110, and rejected the notion that “something that is 
quintessentially religious’ or ‘decidedly religious in nature” 
cannot “also be characterized properly as the teaching of 
morals and character development from a particular 
viewpoint,” id. at 111 (citing Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 512 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting)).  It did not “disclaim” the government’s 
prerogative or power to ban a particular subject matter 
without thereby engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.  Nor did the Good News Club Court 
specifically examine the question of how to treat speech on 
the subject matter of religion that is “not ‘primarily’ about” 
some other permissible topic (id. (quoting Archdiocese of 
Wash., 897 F.3d at 329).)  On the contrary, the Court’s 
reasoning is premised on the fundamental distinction between 
viewpoint and subject matter.  It explained that Rosenberger 
“concluded simply that the university’s denial of funding to 
print Wide Awake was viewpoint discrimination, just as the 
school district’s refusal to allow Lamb’s Chapel to show its 
films was viewpoint discrimination.”  Id. at 110 (emphasis 
added) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831).  The Supreme 
Court then rejected the Second Circuit’s belief that the highly 
religious aspects of the Good News Club’s teaching of morals 
and character development effectively “tainted” its expression 
so that it no longer constituted a viewpoint on the otherwise 
permissible subject matter of moral and character education, 
e.g.: 
 
What matters for purposes of the Free Speech 
Clause is that we can see no logical difference 
in kind between the invocation of Christianity 
by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, 
loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to 
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provide a foundation for their lessons.  It is 
apparent that the unstated principle of the Court 
of Appeals’ reasoning is its conclusion that any 
time religious instruction and prayer are used to 
discuss morals and character, the discussion is 
simply not a “pure” discussion of those issues.  
According to the Court of Appeals, reliance on 
Christian principles taints moral and character 
instruction in a way that other foundations for 
thought or viewpoints do not.  We, however, 
have never reached such a conclusion.  Instead, 
we reaffirm our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and 
Rosenberger that speech discussing otherwise 
permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a 
limited public forum on the ground that the 
subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.  
Thus, we conclude that Milford’s exclusion of 
the Club from use of the school, pursuant to its 
community use policy, constitutes 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 
 
Id. at 111-12 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Child 
Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. 
Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 528 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that Good 
News Club rejected Second Circuit’s position that something 
that is quintessentially religious or decidedly religious in 
nature cannot also be characterized as teaching of morals and 
character from particular viewpoint and that what ultimately 
mattered was lack of logical difference between invocation of 
Christianity and invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or 
patriotism as foundation for such teaching).  The Supreme 
Court then proceeded to distinguish the club’s activities from 
“mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral 
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values.”  Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4 (further 
noting that Second Circuit never determined that activities 
actually constituted religious worship and explaining that, 
“[r]egardless of the label Justice Souter wishes to use [i.e., an 
evangelical service of worship], what matters is the substance 
of the Club’s activities, which we conclude are materially 
indistinguishable from the activities in Lamb’s Chapel and 
Rosenberger”).   
 
 This narrower reading of Good News Club is 
consistent with basic First Amendment principles.  As Judge 
Wilkins succinctly put it, the “[f]orum doctrine’s boundary 
between permissible subject-matter restrictions and 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination is a load-bearing wall 
in the First Amendment’s structure.”  Archdiocese of Wash., 
897 F.3d at 339 (Wilkins, J., concurring).   
 
Even the majority appears to recognize that there is a 
well-established and fundamental distinction between subject-
matter and viewpoint restrictions.  It certainly may be 
difficult to distinguish subject matter from viewpoint, 
especially where the subject matter at issue constitutes both a 
comprehensive body of thought (i.e., a subject matter) and a 
source for points of view from which to discuss a variety of 
other subject matters (i.e., viewpoints).  See, e.g., 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31.  But it is well established 
that “a government may sometimes impose content or speaker 
limitations that protect the use of its property,” while, “no 
matter what kind of property is at issue, viewpoint 
discrimination is out of bounds.”  (Id. at 11 (citing Minn. 





[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld and 
applied the distinction between subject matter 
and viewpoint.  See, e.g., Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 
1885 (“[O]ur decisions have long recognized 
that the government may impose some content-
based restrictions in nonpublic forum[s].”); 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, [135 S. Ct. 2218, 
2230] (2015) (“Government discrimination 
among viewpoints—or the regulation of speech 
based on the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker—is a 
more blatant and egregious form of content 
discrimination” than subject-matter restrictions 
(quotation marks omitted)); Rosenberger, [515 
U.S. at 830-31] (distinguishing between 
restricting religious subject matter and religious 
viewpoints). 
 
Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 338-39 (Wilkins, J., 
concurring).  “[T]he speech restrictions struck down in 
Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club each 
singled out religious viewpoints that otherwise fell within 
prospectively defined, permissible subject matter.  Stated 
otherwise, those decisions involved rules that permitted 
private speakers to discuss categories A, B, and C, but when a 
speaker sought to discuss C from a pro-religious perspective, 
they were improperly prohibited from doing so.”  Id. at 338 
(Wilkins, J., concurring).  In contrast, WMATA barred 
advertisements that promote or oppose any religion, religious 
practice, or belief:  “Guideline 12 is thus a categorical 
subject-matter restriction by its own terms:  It prohibits any 
advertisement whatsoever on the subject of religious or anti-
religious advocacy, whether favoring or opposing religion in 
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general, or any particular religion, belief, or practice.”1  Id. at 
337 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 
831); see also, e.g., id. at 325 (“But far from being an 
abrogation of the distinction between permissible subject 
matter rules and impermissible viewpoint discrimination, 
each of these cases represents an application of the Supreme 
Court’s viewpoint discrimination analysis, of which 
Guideline 12 does not run afoul.”); Child Evangelism 
Fellowship, 386 F.3d at 528 (“Cases such as Lamb’s Chapel, 
Rosenberger, and Good News Club establish that if 
government permits the discussion of a topic from a secular 
perspective, it may not shut out speech that discusses the 
same topic from a religious perspective.”).     
 
This distinction between viewpoint and subject matter 
actually encourages the government to open (or keep open) 
                                              
1 According to the majority, the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning echoes the dissent in Rosenberger.  But the 
Supreme Court majority obviously did not believe it was 
eviscerating the basic distinction between viewpoint and 
subject matter.  After all, Rosenberger explained, inter alia, 
that religion—even though it may be “a comprehensive body 
of thought” or “a vast area of inquiry”—“also provides, as it 
did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from 
which a variety of subjects may be discussed and 
considered.”  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (emphasis added).  
“The prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter, 
resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments for the 
subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved 
category of publications.”  Id.   Likewise, neither I nor the 
D.C. Circuit take issue with Rosenberger’s recognition that 
not “all debate is bipolar.”  Id.      
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forums to speech that they might otherwise completely 
exclude.  The principle that the government may restrict 
speech in a non-public forum so long as it maintains 
viewpoint neutrality and acts reasonably “‘encourage[s] the 
government to open its property to some expressive activity 
in cases where, if faced with an all or nothing choice, it might 
not open the property at all.’”  Archdiocese of Wash., 897 
F.3d at 324 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998))).  The government is also 
required to establish prospective and categorical subject 
matter regulations, thereby preserving its ability to manage 
potentially sensitive non-public forums while cabining its 
discretion to censor.  Id. at 324-25 (further noting importance 
of such constraint in context of religious speech given 
constitutional commitment to religious liberty and role of 
religiously motivated dissent in landmark free speech case 
law); see also, e.g., id. at 337 (Wilkins, J., concurring) 
(observing that requirement to set prospective and categorical 
rules provides public with notice of what speech is allowed 
and constrains discretion of government to pick favorites on 
ad hoc basis).  One basic premise of the First Amendment is 
to encourage more— not less—speech.  See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“[I]t is our law and 
tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule.”).  
Yet “[w]ithout reasonable control over the content of private 
speech in nonpublic forums, government may elect to close a 
forum entirely rather than deal with the administrative burden 
or floodgate consequences of accepting private speech 
without effective subject-matter restrictions.”  Archdiocese of 
Wash., 897 F.3d at 337 (Wilkins, J., concurring).  In fact, the 
majority suggests that COLTS would have to exclude even 
more speech if it wished to adopt a constitutionally effective 




Furthermore, the majority’s approach “offers no 
principled reason for excepting religion from the general 
proposition that governments may exclude subjects in their 
non-public forums.”  Id. at 325.  The majority suggests that 
religious advertisements are “entitled to special protection” 
(id. at 30-31 (citing Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 
F.3d 65, 100 (1st Cir. 2004) (Torruella, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. 
Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993); Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943); Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 
(2017)))—over and above the protection accorded to “issue-
oriented” or political advertisements (id. at 29-30 (citing 
Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 
910 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Griffith, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Am. Freedom 
Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 901 F.3d 
356, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2665 
(2019); Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility 
Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 698 F.3d 885, 894 (6th Cir. 2012))).  
Like the D.C. Circuit, I agree that the protection of religious 
expression is of critical importance.  See, e.g., id. at 324-25.  
Yet the same thing could be said about political speech.  Like 
religion, politics “also provides . . . a specific premise, a 
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects 
may be discussed and considered,’” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 
825.  “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion.”  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., 
Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 339 (Wilkins, J., 
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concurring) (“After all, political speech has frequently been 
designated as the most highly protected form of First 
Amendment expression.” (citing Pursuing America’s 
Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).  Bans 
on political speech in non-public forums have been upheld, 
and a more expansive approach to viewpoint discrimination 
may force the complete closure of non-public forums to all 
private speech.  See, e.g., Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 
325 (“Although religious speech might be an exception either 
because it is highly valuable or because it receives specific 
protection in the First Amendment, the same can be said of 
political speech on which the Supreme Court has upheld bans 
against constitutional challenges.  See, e.g., Ark. Educ. 
Television Comm’n, [523 U.S. at 669]; [Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)].  The 
Archdiocese’s position could have sweeping implications for 
what speech a government may be compelled to allow once it 
allows any at all, even forcing a choice between opening non-
public forums to almost any private speech or none, which the 
Supreme Court acknowledged in Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission, [523 U.S. at 680], was not merely 
hypothetical.”).   
 
The majority calls into question D.C. Circuit’s 
indication that speech on an impermissible subject matter 
may be barred if it does not also “primarily” relate to a 
permissible subject matter.  In addition to reading too much 
into the Supreme Court’s Good News Club opinion, the 
majority overlooks the D.C. Circuit’s reference to whether the 
advertisement is “recognizably” about a permissible topic.  
Id. at 329.  Judge Wilkins also aptly observes that “such 
alleged ‘viewpoint’ discrimination could always be reverse-
engineered by comparing a prohibited statement with any 
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permitted statement—real or hypothetical—and finding some 
kind of subject-matter commonality between the two.”  Id. at 
338 (Wilkins, J., concurring).  Such an expansive 
understanding (especially because it must logically extend to 
other subject matters like politics) would effectively make it 
impossible to establish any content requirements for non-
public forums or otherwise cause governmental entities to 
close their forums to yet more and more topics for 
expression.2   
 
Applying the D.C. Circuit’s approach, I see no 
meaningful difference between the advertisements and 
policies at issue in the WMATA proceeding and in this case.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err by rejecting 
Freethought’s claim of viewpoint discrimination.   
                                              
2 I further note that Freethought’s briefing in this case 
does not really take issue with the D.C. Circuit’s “subject 
matter” approach—and instead endeavors to distinguish 
COLTS’s policy from the policy adopted by the WMATA.  
(See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 29-30 (“COLTS’ ‘religious’ 
provision goes far beyond prohibiting advertisements on the 
topics of religion or atheism.  It also prohibits advertisements 
on any topic that contains any reference to the existence of 
religion or atheism.  Cf., Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. 
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 877 F.3d 1066, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) [(denying motion for injunction pending appeal)] 
(‘WMATA does not exclude religious speakers from 
advertising when their proposed messages comport with the 




Initially, both the “religion” provisions as well as the 
respective forums are very similar.3  Like other public transit 
agencies around the country, both COLTS and WMATA 
(which previously had maintained designated public forums 
on their advertising space) have attempted to address (or to 
prevent in the future) problems arising from various 
inflammatory advertisements (see, e.g., id. at 6 
(“[Wintermantel] began researching other transit systems’ 
policies and identified controversies in other cities kindled by 
inflammatory ad campaigns.”)).  See, e.g., id. at 319 
(“Beginning in 2010, WMATA began to reconsider its 
                                              
3 The majority takes issue with the D.C. Circuit’s 
“choice to conduct a forum analysis before determining 
whether the policy discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.”  
(Majority Opinion at 19.)  I completely agree that viewpoint 
discrimination is not permitted in any forum.  But this does 
not mean that the nature and scope of the forum is irrelevant 
to the determination of whether there is viewpoint 
discrimination.  Even the majority considers whether the 
range of subject matters permitted in the forum at issue 
includes a topic the speaker wants to address.  Furthermore, 
“[a]lthough observing that ‘Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and 
Good News Club, read together, draw into question whether a 
blanket ban such as Vermont’s on all religious messages in a 
forum that has otherwise been broadly opened to expression 
on a wide variety of subjects can neatly be classified as purely 
a “subject matter” restriction for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis,’ the [Second Circuit] declined to 
‘address bans on religious speech in forums limited to 
discussion of certain, designated topics.’”  Archdiocese of 
Wash., 897 F.3d at 327 (quoting Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 
46, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2010)).   
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approach as a result of near-monthly complaints from its 
employees, riders, elected officials, and community and 
business leaders about its advertisements. . . . The Metro 
Transit Police Department and the United States Department 
of Homeland Security ‘feared that certain ads would, due to 
world events, incite individuals to violence on the system and 
harm WMATA employees and customers.’ . . . . Additionally, 
a survey showed that ‘98% of the public was familiar with the 
types of ads found on buses, in trains, and in stations,’ that 
‘58% opposed issue-oriented ads,’ and that ‘46% were 
extremely opposed to . . . issue-oriented ads.’” (citations 
omitted)).  Accordingly, the 2013 COLTS Policy prohibits 
the following advertisements: 
 
 for tobacco or alcohol or for businesses that 
primarily traffic in such goods; 
 that promotes the use of firearms or firearm-
related products or for businesses that primarily 
traffic in such goods; 
 that are obscene, pornographic, or promotes or 
depict sexually-oriented goods or services or for 
businesses that primarily traffic in such goods 
or services or that appeal to prurient interests; 
 that promotes violence or sexual conduct; 
 that are deemed defamatory, illegal, fraudulent, 
misleading or false; 
 that proposes a transaction or activity that is 
prohibited by federal, state or local law; 
 that exploit the likeness, picture, image or name 
of any person, and/or trademark, trade name, 
copyrighted materials or other intellectual 
property of a third party, without adequate proof 
of express written authorization to do so; 
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 that contain, employ or imply profane or vulgar 
words; 
 that demean or disparage a person, group of 
persons, business or group of businesses; 
 that, if permitted, could reasonably subject 
COLTS to civil or criminal liability; 
 that are political in nature or contain political 
messages, including advertisements involving 
political figures or candidates for public offices, 
advertisements involving political parties or 
political affiliations, and/or advertisements 
involving an issue reasonably deemed by 
COLTS to be political in nature in that it 
directly or indirectly implicates the action, 
inaction, prospective action, or policies of a 
governmental entity. 
 that promote the existence or non-existence of a 
supreme deity, deities, being or beings; that 
address, promote, criticize or attack a religion 
or religions, religious beliefs or lack of religious 
beliefs; that directly quote or cite scriptures, 
religious text or texts involving religious beliefs 
or lack of religious beliefs; or are otherwise 
religious in nature. 
 
(JA687-JA688.)  “WMATA adopted Guidelines Governing 
Commercial Advertising, employing broad subject-matter 
prohibitions in order to maintain viewpoint neutrality and 
avoid ad hoc prohibitions about which ads are benign and 
which are not.”  Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 318-19.  
Like COLTS’s ban on advertisements that promote, criticize, 
or attack a religion, religions, religious beliefs, or the lack of 
religious beliefs, “Guideline 12 states:  ‘Advertisements that 
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promote or oppose any religion, religious practice or belief 
are prohibited.’”  Id.  The WMATA Guidelines also included 
the following prohibitions: 
 
9.  Advertisements intended to influence 
members of the public regarding an issue on 
which there are varying opinions are prohibited. 
 
10.  Advertisements of tobacco products are 
prohibited . . . .  
 
11.  Advertisements that support or oppose any 
political party or candidate are prohibited. 
 
13.  Advertisements that support or oppose an 
industry position or industry goal without any 
direct commercial benefit to the advertiser are 
prohibited. 
 
14.  Advertisements that are intended to 
influence public policy are prohibited. 
 
Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area. Transit Auth., 
281 F. Supp. 3d 88, 96 (D.D.C. 2017) (Guideline 12 omitted) 
(citation omitted).   
 
The WMATA’s Guidelines—and consequently 
COLTS’s equivalent standards—are unlike the policies at 
issue in Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club.  
“To the extent those cases can be read to blur the line 
between religion-as-subject-matter and a religious viewpoint, 
the Supreme Court’s analysis emphasizes the breadth of the 
forums involved:  the “broad range” of activities in service of 
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“educational purpose” contemplated in Rosenberger, [515 
U.S. at 824], and the capacious range of ‘social, civic, and 
recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses 
pertaining to the welfare of the community’ that might have 
been permitted in [Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993)], and Good 
News Club, [533 U.S. at 102].”  Archdiocese of Wash., 897 
F.3d at 327.  “By contrast, [WMATA’s forum as well as 
COLTS’s forum—consisting of advertising space—are] not 
so broad, much less inviting through [their] advertisements 
public debate on religion.”  Id.  
    
 The Archdiocese of Washington’s proposed 
“evangelistic ad” depicted “‘a starry night and the silhouettes 
of three shepherds and sheep on a hill facing a bright shining 
star high in the sky, along with the words “Find the Perfect 
Gift”’” (and included a web address and social media 
hashtag).  (Majority Opinion at 18 (quoting Archdiocese of 
Wash., 897 F.3d at 320).)  The D.C. Circuit persuasively 
rejected the Archdiocese’s argument that its advertisement 
addressed permissible topics like charitable giving (as well as 
an amici’s assertion that its advertisement exhorting viewers 
to visit the Franciscan Monastery of the Holy Land in 
America expressed its religious viewpoint on places to visit): 
 
These contentions are unpersuasive because the 
subjects on which the Archdiocese and the 
Monastery claim they wish to speak through 
advertisements on WMATA buses are either not 
subjects within the forum or are not subjects on 
which they have shown they could not speak 




 The Archdiocese’s “Find the Perfect 
Gift” ad is not primarily or recognizably about 
charitable giving, as it is not primarily or 
recognizably about opening hours or places to 
visit.  Like the Monastery’s ad, the 
Archdiocese’s ad is a religious ad, an 
exhortation, repeatedly acknowledged by the 
Archdiocese to be part of its evangelization 
effort to attend mass at Catholic churches in 
connection with Advent.  The imagery of the 
Archdiocese’s “Find the Perfect Gift” ad is 
evocative not of the desirability of charitable 
giving, but rather the saving grace of Christ, 
which is not a subject included in the WMATA 
forum.  Had the Archdiocese wished to submit 
an ad encouraging charitable giving, nothing in 
the record suggests it could not do so.  
WMATA accepted the ad of the Salvation 
Army, a religious organization whose ad 
exhorted giving to charity but contained only 
non-religious imagery.  WMATA 
acknowledged in the district court, and again in 
this court that it would not reject as running 
afoul of Guideline 12 an ad from the 
Archdiocese that read “[P]lease [G]ive to 
Catholic Charities.” 
 
Id. at 329 (further rejecting Archdiocese’s theory that 
commercial advertising promoting Christmastime sales 
expressed view on how to celebrate Christmas); see also, e.g., 
id. at 330 (“The Archdiocese’s suggestion that WMATA has 
been inconsistent because it accepted an ad from a yoga 
studio containing the slogan ‘Muscle + Mantra,’ ignores that 
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ad is not recognizably religious as the Archdiocese’s ad 
plainly is, by its own characterization.”).   
 
 Freethought’s proposed advertisement says in big print 
“Atheists,” and provides the name of the organization and a 
website.  In fact, it goes to the very heart of the subject matter 
of religion—the existence or non-existence of a deity.  The 
2013 Policy expressly bars advertising “that promote the 
existence or non-existence of a supreme deity, deities, beings 
or beings” (JA687), and COLTS stipulated at trial that it 
rejected the proposed advertisement because “the proposed 
advertisement addressed the non-existence of a deity” (JA61; 
see also, e.g., JA701 (letter rejecting earlier proposed 
“Atheists” advertisement because “COLTS does not accept 
advertisements that promote the belief that ‘there is no God’ 
or advertisements that promote the belief that ‘there is a 
God’”).  Freethought engages in debates over the existence or 
non-existence of God.  “A typical consequence of the 
appearance of Freethought at an event is the discussion of 
whether or not God exists.”  Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. 
Cty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 327 F. Supp. 3d 767, 771 
(M.D. Pa. 2018).  In turn, the proposed advertisement does 
not reference, to give just a couple of examples, either 
instruction in morals and character or the desirability of 
charitable giving from an atheistic point of view.  
Accordingly, I believe that—just like the Archdiocese of 
Washington’s “Find the Perfect Gift” submission—
Freethought’s advertisement clearly implicates the prohibited 






 The majority concludes that, even if COLTS’s 
religious speech ban were viewpoint neutral and COLTS’s 
advertising space were now a limited or non-public forum,4 it 
                                              
4 Unlike the majority, I believe that COLTS effectively 
closed the forum at issue here.  While COLTS had previously 
opened its advertising space as a designated public forum, it 
“may limit or close the forum at any time” (Majority Opinion 
at 22 n.2 (citing United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 647 
(3d Cir. 1986))).  See, e.g., Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 
323 (“Having plainly evinced its intent in 2015 to close 
WMATA’s advertising space to certain subjects, the Board of 
Directors converted that space into a non-public forum in the 
manner contemplated by the Supreme Court.” (citing 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803-04)); Ridley, 390 F.3d at 77 (“The 
government is free to change the nature of any nontraditional 
forum as it wishes.  Thus, even if MBTA’s previous intent 
was to maintain a designated public forum, it would be free to 
decide in good faith to close the forum at any time.  There is 
no evidence that the 2003 changes were adopted as a mere 
pretext to reject plaintiff’s advertisements.” (citing Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 802)).  Even setting aside the purportedly 
deficient language identified by the majority, the 2013 Policy 
sets forth a number of categorical subject-matter limitations, 
excluding, among other topics, advertisements on the topic of 
religion as well as political advertising (i.e., advertisements 
“that are political in nature or contain political messages, 
including advertisements involving political figures or 
candidates for public offices, [and/or] advertisements 
involving political parties or political affiliations” (JA687)).  
As I explain in more detail in my reasonableness analysis, 
COLTS properly sought to address issues affecting transit 
agencies throughout the country, including threats, boycotts, 
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does not survive scrutiny as a content-based restriction.  I do 
not agree. 
 
 The reasonableness standard is more exacting than the 
rational basis inquiry, and the government bears the burden of 
proof.  See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 
435, 441-45 (3d Cir. 2016).  Nevertheless, “[r]easonableness 
is a relatively low bar.”  Id. at 443.  “Unlike with strict 
scrutiny, this review does not require narrow tailoring or the 
absence of less restrictive alternatives.  Indeed, the 
‘Government’s decision to restrict access . . . need only be 
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only 
reasonable limitation.’”  Id. at 441 (quoting Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 808).  COLTS has a two-step burden to meet:  (1) 
“The evidence or commonsense inferences must allow us to 
grasp the purpose to which [COLTS] has devoted the forum;” 
and (2) “the evidence or commonsense inferences also must 
provide a way of tying the limitation on speech to the forum’s 
purpose.”  Id. at 445 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 
836 (1976)); see also, e.g., Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1888 
(“Although there is no requirement of narrow tailoring in a 
nonpublic forum, the State must be able to articulate some 
sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what 
must stay out.” (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808-09)). 
 
 Significantly, the majority appears to agree that 
COLTS satisfies the first step, identifying raising revenue and 
maintaining or increasing ridership as purposes of the forum.  
It properly rejects Freethought’s assertion that the ridership 
interest should be disregarded “because COLTS stipulated 
that they were not goals when it first opened its ad space and 
                                                                                                     
and vandalism.        
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when it enacted the 2011 policy.”  (Majority Opinion at 23-
24.)  “But we assess both the speech forum and the broader 
government property of which it is part.  See Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 801-02.  An advertising program that deters all or 
many riders is inconsistent with the purpose of a public bus.  
See NAACP, 834 F.3d at 445-46 (holding commonsense 
inferences can support explanation of forum’s purpose).”  (Id. 
at 24.) 
 
 Having satisfied the initial step of the reasonableness 
inquiry, COLTS must establish—with either record evidence 
or common sense—an adequate connection between the 
forum’s purposes and the speech limitation.  I believe that it 
does.     
 
 “[T]he record demonstrates that the advertising policy, 
at its core, was enacted to avoid controversy on the buses for 
the safety and comfort of passengers.  This, in turn, was to 
maintain ridership and, as a result, revenue.”  Ne. Pa. 
Freethought Soc’y, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 775 n.5.  As the 
majority acknowledges, the government may exclude speech 
“because its controversial nature adversely impacts the 
forum’s other purposes” (even though this sort of exclusion 
must be treated with a degree of skepticism).  United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l 
Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 356 (6th Cir. 1998) (“We note, 
however, that the Supreme Court has suggested that 
excluding speech because its controversial nature adversely 
impacts the forum’s other purposes constitutes a reasonable 
restriction on access to a nonpublic forum.” (citing Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 811)); see also, e.g., NAACP, 834 F.3d at 446 
(“We note at the outset that, although the City is permitted 
under the right circumstances to dedicate a limited public or 
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nonpublic forum to controversy avoidance, this objective is 
nebulous and not susceptible to objective verification.  As a 
result, Supreme Court guidance cautions against readily 
drawing inferences, in the absence of evidence, that 
controversy avoidance renders the ban constitutional.” (citing 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (plurality opinion)).    
 
COLTS reasonably asserts that heated debates on its 
buses could deter riders, distract the drivers, endanger 
passengers, and reduce revenue.  “COLTS cited disruptions 
on other transit systems in formulating its policy—disruptions 
that led to anonymous threats against buses, as well as 
boycotts and vandalism.”  (Id. at 25.)  It is certainly 
reasonable to infer that these problems could spread onto the 
buses themselves—and that such disturbances could then cost 
the transit system both riders and money.  A government 
“need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict access to a 
nonpublic forum.”  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 810 (citing Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 37, 52 n.12 
(1983)). 
 
In Lehman, “Justice Douglas provided the fifth vote 
for the outcome in a concurring opinion that focused heavily 
on the issue of captive audiences.”  NAACP, 834 F.3d at 448 
n.6 (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 
308 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment)).  At least 
part of COLTS’s forum clearly implicates Justice Douglas’s 
concern.  (See, e.g., id. at 28 (“To be sure, the captive 
audience concern does apply to part of COLTS’s forum (the 
interior space).”).)  “In asking us to force the system to accept 
[its] message as a vindication of [its] constitutional rights, 
[Freethought] overlooks the constitutional rights of the 
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commuters.  While [Freethought] clearly has a right to 
express [its] views to those who wish to listen, [it] has no 
right to force [its] message upon an audience incapable of 
declining to receive it.”  Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, 
J., concurring in judgment) (further noting that public transit 
is practical necessity for many people).   
 
The majority also admits that “COLTS argues with 
some force that its blanket ban [on religious speech] serves 
valid interests in appearing neutral.”  (Id. at 31.)  We have 
recognized that “[t]he desire to avoid potentially disruptive 
controversy and maintain the appearance of neutrality is 
sufficient justification for excluding speakers from a [limited 
forum].”  Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Sch. Directors,. 776 F.2d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(citing Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304).  As the Ninth Circuit 
explained in a decision upholding a transit system’s ban on 
non-commercial bus advertising, “[t]he city’s interests in 
protecting revenue and maintaining neutrality on political and 
religious issues are especially strong.”  Children of the 
Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1998).  
“[I]n fact, Mr. Vacula testified that he wants the government 
to remain neutral on matters of religion,” Ne. Pa. Freethought 
Soc’y, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 782. 
 
In conclusion, “reasonableness review imposes a light 
burden” (id. (citing NAACP, 834 F.3d at 449)), and I believe 
that COLTS meets this burden.  At some points, the majority 
seems to hold the transit agency to a higher burden, indicating 
inter alia that it could exclude many controversial 
advertisements through more targeted restrictions.  See, e.g., 
NAACP, 834 F.3d at 441 (pointing out that reasonableness 
review does not require narrow tailoring or absence of less 
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restrictive alternatives).  In any event, our sister circuits have 
upheld similar speech restrictions in the public transit context.  
See, e.g., Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 329-31; Am. 
Freedom Def. Initiative. 698 F.3d at 892-95; Ridley, 390 F.3d 
at 93; Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 978-79.  In 
Archdiocese of Washington, the D.C. Circuit persuasively 
explained why the WMATA’s decision to ban advertisements 
on the subject matter of religion was reasonable.  “In 2015, 
WMATA decided to avoid the divisiveness caused by certain 
advertisements and specifically to avoid the inflamed 
passions surrounding religion.”  Archdiocese of Wash., 897 
F.3d at 330.  While WMATA actually received complaints 
regarding prior controversial advertisements, COLTS 
reasonably relied on reports of problems plaguing other 
transit agencies (including WMATA) throughout the country 
concerning controversial advertisements, such as 
advertisements regarding the non-existence of God.  Like 
WMATA, “[COLTS’s] closure of its forum is reasonable in 





                                              
5 I also agree with the District Court that “COLTS 
revised their 2011 Policy and, in the 2013 Policy, took away 
COLTS’ unfettered discretion to refuse advertisements.”  Ne. 
Pa. Freethought Soc’y, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 784; see also, e.g., 
Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 330 (upholding 
WMATA’s policy because it articulated sensible basis for 
distinguishing prohibited and permissible speech).   
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 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the final 
judgment entered by the District Court in favor of COLTS 
and against Freethought.   
 
 
